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UNIVERSAL COVERAGE AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH

CARE SYSTEM IN CRISIS (AGAIN)

RICK MAYES, PH.D.*

"The system is collapsing aroundus. "i... I've become more convinced
as time goes by that our health care system is fundamentally broken and needs
2
major surgery; . . . I think we're standingon the edge of a cliff.
-U.S. Senator John Breaux

"But Thou, 0 Lord, how long?"
-King

David

3

Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Department of Political Science, University of Richmond;
Faculty Research Fellow, Petris Center on Healthcare Markets & Consumer Welfare, School of Public
Health, University of California, Berkeley. Professor Mayes is the author of UNIVERSAL COVERAGE:
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE (forthcoming Fall, 2004).
*I wish to thank numerous individuals who critiqued previous versions of this paper, including Cecelia
Ackerman, Tom Cosgrove, Abby Emerson, Lindsay Shore, Meredith Stewart, T.R. Straub, and
especially Jennifer Mayes. My reexamination of President Clinton's failure at health care reform
benefited from personal interviews with numerous individuals who graciously shared their time and
recollections with me, including: former Staff Director of the House Ways and Means Health
Subcommittee, David Abernethy; President Clinton's Health Care Communications Director, Bob
Boorstin; Chief of Staff to former Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, Sheila Burke; Representative Jim
Cooper; initial Senior Advisor to the Health Care Task Force, Alain Enthoven; President and CEO of
the National Federation of Independent Businesses, Jack Faris; Director of President Clinton's Health
Care Transition Team, Judy Feder; Senior Economist for the Clinton Health Care Task Force, Sherry
Glied; former Democratic Senator from Nebraska, Bob Kerrey; former President of the Business
Roundtable, John Ong; former White House Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta; former Senior Medicare
Analyst for the Senate Finance Committee, Lisa Potetz; former CBO Director, Robert Reischauer;
former Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Dan Rostenkowski; former Secretary of
the Treasury, Robert Rubin; former CMS Administrator, Tom Scully; Representative Pete Stark; former
Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, Laura D'Andrea Tyson; former HCFA Administrators,
Gail Wilensky, Bruce Vladeck and Nancy-Ann DeParle; Representative Henry Waxman; and former
Chairman of Prudential Insurance and Chair of the Business Roundtable's Health Subcommittee,
Robert Winters.
1.Marcia Angell, The ForgottenDomestic Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at A 13.
2. Gail R. Wilensky, Interview, Thinking Outside the Box: A Conversation with John Breaux,
HEALTH AFFAIRS WEB EXCLUSIVE, W3-124, W3-124, W3-130 (March 5, 2003), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.124vl .pdf (last visited June 19, 2004).
3. Psalm 6:3.
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Another health care crisis has emerged in the United States. It was inevitable. Ten years after President Clinton's ambitious attempt at comprehensive health
care reform died so ignominiously, the same problems-only worse-have
returned, and even some new ones have appeared. The following is a brief
overview of just some of the leading problems associated with our nation's health
care system.
After declining slightly in 1999 and 2000, at the height of the country's
economic boom, the number of uninsured Americans rose to 43.6 million in 2002
(15.2% of the population ).4 These figures have since increased. 5 The lack of
health insurance coverage has become as much a "working class" and "middle
class" phenomenon as it is a "poor" one. Roughly one-third of all Americans
earning between $25,000 and $75,000 (20,110,000 individuals) are uninsured.6
More than 75% of the uninsured work full-time and about one-third earn more than
$50,000 annually. 7 If you include individuals who have experienced a temporary
lack of coverage, the number of Americans without health insurance at some point
during the last two years rose to 75 million in 2002, which is nearly one-third of all
Americans younger than 65.8 Even the affluent are not immune. The number of
uninsured people with household incomes of $75,000 or more rose to 7.3 million
in 2002, an increase of 633,000 from the prior year. 9
Not only are there millions of Americans without insurance, the costs for
those who do have insurance are rapidly increasingly. Unlike a decade ago, when
health care costs and insurance premiums were decreasing, both have been steadily
rising at a greater pace than the general rate of inflation since 1998.1° Total
national spending on health care grew 8.6% in 2002, marking the biggest one-year

4. ROBERT J. MILLS & SHAILESH BHANDARI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REP.
PUB. P60-223, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2002, CONSUMER INCOME 4

(2003), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthin02.html

(last visited June 19, 2004)

[hereinafter HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2002].

5. See Press Release, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Up to 1.6 Million Low-Income
People - Including About A Half A Million Children - Are Losing Health Coverage Due To State
Budget Cuts (Dec. 22, 2003), availableat http://www.cbpp.org/12-22-03health-pr.pdf (last visited June
19, 2004).
6. HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2002, supranote 4, at 2.
7. Ceci Connolly & Amy Goldstein, Health Insurance Back as Key Issue, WASH. POST, Mar. 16,
2003, at A5.
8. Robin Toner, Study Raises Estimate of the Nation's Uninsured,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2003, at
A19.
9. HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2002, supranote 4, at 2.
10. Bradley C. Strunk et al., Tracking Health Care Costs: Growth Accelerates Again in 2001,
HEALTH

AFFAIRS

WEB

EXCLUSIVE,

W299,

W300-02

(Sept.

25,

2002),

http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi /reprint/hlthaff.w2.299vl .pdf?ck nck (last visited June 19, 2004).
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increase since 1993.II Employers' health insurance premiums rose by an average
of almost 14% in 2003, more than anticipated and the largest increase since 1990.12
Small companies of less than ten employees have seen their insurance premiums
rise-provided they can still afford them-by as much as 20% or more per year
since 2001.13 Unfortunately the future does not look better. "The number of
uninsured will continue to grow as long as health insurance premiums rise more
rapidly than earnings, as they have for a decade," notes Drew E. Altman, president
of the Kaiser Family Foundation, which tracks health coverage trends.' 4 "Losing
health benefits is becoming a middle-class issue. If it had not been for expansions
in the child health program and Medicaid, we would have 10 million more unin15
sured."'
One particularly alarming consequence of these worsening trends is that
health care related problems are one of the leading causes of personal bankruptcy
in the United States. 16 Upwards of 600,000 individual cases in 1999, or nearly 50%
of the total number of non-business bankruptcy filings, were traceable to one or
more of these problems: lack of health insurance, insufficient health insurance,
and/or substantial medical bills. 17 Given the recession and sluggish economic
growth that have occurred since then, it is certain that these figures have only
worsened. 18

The government's two primary health insurance programs-Medicare for
the elderly and disabled and Medicaid for the poor-are experiencing considerable
financial strain. As they face their worst fiscal crises in more than fifty years, states
are cutting Medicaid benefits and eligibility at the same time that a sputtering
economy has boosted demand for the program.' 9 Meanwhile, Medicare has

11. Stephen Hefiler et al., Health Spending Projections for 2002-2012, HEALTH AFFAIRS WEB
EXCLUSIVE,
W3-54,
W3-56
(Feb.
7,
2003),
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi
/reprint/hlthaff.w3.54v I(last visited June 19, 2004).
12. Id.at W3-55. See also Barbara Martinez, Rate of Increasefor Health Care May be Slowing,
WALL ST. J., June 11, 2003 at A 1.
13. Len Strazewski, Benefits Business: Health PlansStay But Change, ROUGH NOTES MAGAZINE,
Jan. 2004, available at http://www.roughnotes.com/rnmagazine/2004/january04/Olpl2.htm (last visited
June 19, 2004).
14. David Broder, Problem of Lost Health Benefits isReaching Into the Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2002, at Al.
15. Id.
16. ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., HARVARD LAW SCH., WORKING PAPER No. 008, MEDICAL

PROBLEMS AND BANKRUPTCY FILINGS 5-6, (2000), availableat http://ssm.com/abstractid=224581 (last
visited June 19, 2004).
17. Id.at 5-6.
18. Press Release, The Access Project, New Report Outlines Far-Reaching Effects of Medical
Debt (Mar. 5, 2003), available at http://www.accessproject.org/downloads/med._preng.pdf (last visited
June 19 2004).
19. For a discussion of the impact of declining economic conditions on Medicaid see John K.
Iglehart, The Dilemma of Medicaid,348 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 2140 (2003); WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2003 (2002),
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suffered from two high-profile problems: a failed experiment with enrolling
beneficiaries in private managed care plans (Medicare+Choice), 20 and an inability
to find a fiscally responsible way to add a prescription drug benefit to the program.
In March 2004 - four months after President Bush signed the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (DIMA) into law on
December 8, 2003 - a scandal erupted over the disclosure that Medicare's chief
actuary, Richard S. Foster, had originally estimated the cost of the new drug
benefit plan to be closer to $550 billion over ten years rather than the $400 billion
figure that lawmakers were led to believe and used in their political deliberations. 21
Not only are many of the poor and elderly often inadequately served by our
health care system, so too are many children. Despite the progress achieved by the
State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) 22 since 1997, 8.5 million or
12% of all youngsters are still uninsured.23 What is worse, a combination of factors
is expected to reduce enrollment in SCHIP and increase the number of uninsured
children by 900,000 by 2006.24 These factors include: pending reductions in
federal SCH1P funding, the expected reversion of previously allocated
federal
25
SCHIP funds to the U.S. Treasury, and growing state budget crises.
How has it all come to this? Parts I, II, and III address each of these problems in greater depth and show how they are often interconnected. Part IV
reexamines President Clinton's failure at health care reform based largely on
interviews with several key policymakers and staff at that time. Some of these
individuals have only recently granted interviews about why and how everything
came to naught in 1993-94. Part V concludes with a brief overview of the leading
proposals for solving the problem of the uninsured that have recently emerged. If
they seem similar to previous proposals dating back to the early 1970s, it is
because they are: hauntingly so. As Yogi Berra once said, "It seems like drjA vu all
over again."

available at http://www.house.gov/budgetdemocrats/budgetfacts/cguide03.pdf (last visited June 19,
2004).
20. See Joseph R. Antos, Medicare+Choice: Where Did the Scorekeepers Go Wrong?, HEALTH
AFFAIRS WEB EXCLUSIVE, W83 (Nov. 28, 2001), at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content
/full/hlthaff.wI.83v1 (last visited June 19, 2004).
21. For a discussion of the deliberation and passage of Medicare's Prescription Drug Benefit, see
John K. Inglehart, The New Medicare Prescription-DrugBenefit - A Pure Power Play, 350 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 826 (2004). For a discussion of the scandal over the estimated cost of Medicare's new
prescription drug benefit, see Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Mysterious Fax Adds to IntrigueOver
Drug Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, at Al.
22. See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 1397bb (2000 & Supp. 2003).
23. HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2002, supra note 4, at 8.
24. LEIGHTON KU, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES, THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS
WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE ROSE IN 2001 AND APPEARS TO BE CONTINUING TO RISE IN

8, 2002), availableat http://www.cbpp.org/9-30-02health.pdf (last visited June 19, 2004).
25. Id. at 6-7.
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I. HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE INCREASING NUMBERS OF THOSE WITHOUT IT
It is hard to grasp the magnitude of the number of uninsured, as Ron
Pollack, executive director of Families USA, has observed.26 Itexceeds the
aggregate population of twenty-four states.27 Ironically, in the late 1990s the
prospects for reaching universal coverage seemed to be improving largely due to
two factors: an expansion in employer-provided coverage and a decrease in the
number of previously uninsured children (thanks to the introduction of SCHIP and
changes to Medicaid).28 This was initially encouraging. The private sector looked
as if it was more than matching the public sector's increased generosity
(Medicaid's and SCHIP's in particular).2 9
As it turned out, the primary reason for the overall increase in health insurance coverage during the latter half of the 1990s was a large contingent of Americans who moved up the income-ladder. 30 Employers were not beset with a spasmodic burst of generosity as much as a "tight labor market[] allowed people to take
jobs with higher earnings and a higher likelihood of employer coverage." 31 During
this period, employers had to either pay higher salaries and provide health
insurance or lose potential employees to their competitors. That changed beginning
in 2001, when the U.S. economy went into recession and 1.4 million Americans
32
lost their health insurance coverage.
The most striking lesson from the mid to late 1990s is that prosperity does
not solve the problem of the uninsured. The country experienced the longest stretch
of uninterrupted economic growth ever recorded, budget surpluses returned after
thirty years of continuous and rising deficits, and unemployment levels hit lows
not seen since the 1960s, yet the rate of the uninsured barely budged.33 The
tremendous economic wave of the 1990s that raised just about every "boat" in
society had little to no effect on the 15% of Americans without health insurance.

26. Press Release, Ron Pollack, Families USA, Census Bureau's Uninsured Number is Largest
Increase in
Past Decade (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://www.familiesusa.org/site
/PageServer?pagename=MediaStatementCensus Bureau (last visited June 19, 2004).

27. Id.
28. See John Holahan & Mary Beth Pohl, Changes in Insurance Coverage: 1994-2000 and
Beyond,
HEALTH
AFFAIRS
WEB
EXCLUSIVE,
W162,
W162
(Apr.
3,
2002),
at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w2.162v I (last visited June 19, 2004).
29. ROBERT J. MILLS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REP. PUB. P60-215, HEALTH

INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2000, CONSUMER INCOME 2 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/prod
/2001 pubs/p60-215.pdf (last visited June 19, 2004)[hereinafter HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2000];
Robert Pear, Number of UninsuredDropsfor Second Year, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2001, at A20.
30. Holohan & Pohl, supra note 28, at W162-63.
31. Holohan & Pohl, supra note 28, at W163.
32. HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2002, supra note 4, at 3; KU, supra note 24, at 1.

33. Holohan & Pohl, supra note 28, at W162-63.

2004]

UNIVERSAL COVERAGE

There are three main reasons for the erosion of private health coverage that
began in 2001. First, unemployment increased. The unemployment rate averaged
4.8% at the beginning of 2001, 5.9% in 2002, and 6.4% by the summer of 2003. 35
Because the majority of American workers and their dependents receive health
insurance coverage from their employers, increasing unemployment leads directly
to greater numbers of uninsured individuals.
Second, fewer and fewer businesses are offering health coverage. 36 A
survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that premiums for employerprovided insurance have climbed an average of 12.7% since 2001. 3 Consequently,
more small and medium-size companies can no longer afford to offer coverage.
While 67% of companies with fewer than 200 employees offered health benefits to
their workers in 2000, only 61% did so in 2002.38
Finally, job-based coverage is becoming too expensive for many workers.
Employers of all sizes are passing on more of their increasing health care costs to
their workers and retirees in the form of larger co-payments, deductibles, and
monthly premiums (particularly for workers' dependents). 39 Kate Sullivan, director
of health policy at the United States Chamber of Commerce, noted that many
employers continue to subsidize insurance for workers, but have reduced such
subsidies for dependents. Sullivan further notes, "A lot of insurers are dropping out
40
of the small-group market, and customers are balking at what they have to pay.,
Much of the recent increase in health care costs and insurance premiums can be
attributed to the demise of managed care (except for the Medicaid and SCHIP
populations) and the reversion to fee-for-service payment. 4 1 Both patients and
medical providers despised many of the administrative rules and procedures that

34. KU, supra note 24, at 1.
35. Ku, supra note 24, at 1.
36. Ku, supra note 24, at 1.
37. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND., DAILY HEALTH POLICY REPORT (Sept. 6, 2002), available at

http://www.kaisemetwork.org/dailyreports/rep

index.cfmhint-3&DR ID=13307 (last visited June

19, 2004); THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH

BENEFITS: 2002 ANNUAL SURVEY 1 (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/3252-index.cfm
(last visited June 19, 2004).
38. Ku, supra note 24, at 3; David Cho, Feeling UninsuredAbout the Future, WASH. POST, May
16, 2003, at B 1.
39. See JENNIFER N. EDWARDS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, ISSUE BRIEF, THE EROSION
OF EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH COVERAGE AND THE THREAT TO WORKER'S HEALTH CARE: FINDINGS

(2002), available
at http://www.cmwf.org/programs/insurance/edwards Erosion ib 559.pdf (last visited June 19, 2004).
40. Robert Pear, After Decline, The Number of Uninsured Rose in 2001, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2002, at A22.
41. Alain C. Enthoven, Employment-Based Health Insurance is Failing: Now What?, HEALTH
AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE (May
28,
2003), at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content
/full/hlthafT.w3.237v I(last visited June 19, 2004).
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 2002 WORKPLACE HEALTH INSURANCE SURVEY
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made managed care so successful in temporarily containing costs. 42 Hence, over
time most of these rules and procedures were either legislated or litigated out of
existence. Employers' transition to managed care effectively controlled costs for a
period in the 1990s, largely because they were able to squeeze payments to
physicians and shorten the average length of most hospital stays. 1 In short, there
was a lot of "fat" in the health care system that could be eliminated through annual,
competitive negotiations between insurers or managed care organizations and
medical providers. After much of the "fat" was removed,44 however, these cost
cutting strategies proved to be short-lived and unsustainable.
In time, as Alain Enthoven explains, "traditional, restrictive managed care
has broken down under an onslaught of attacks from trial attorneys, 45 politicians,
patients, and providers. 6 Consequently, we are now back to runaway health care
' 7
inflation, with annual premium increases of 15 to 20% or more in some areas. "
Meanwhile, health maintenance organizations (HMOs) remain deeply unpopular. 48
Patients resent administrative restrictions to medical care just as much as (if not
more than) providers resent restrictions to providing it. 4 9 Thus many employers
have moved away from rigid, cost-conscious managed care plans to more lightly
managed preferred provider models (PPOs) and, in some cases, even reverted
50
entirely to traditional fee-for-service insurance arrangements.
Who are the uninsured? Compared to the general population, the uninsured
tend to be younger, have somewhat lower incomes and less education; 51 they are
more likely to be members of minority groups, and to work in service industries

42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Gregg Bloche & David M. Studdert, A Quiet Revolution: Law As An Agent of Health
System Change, 23 HEALTH AFF 29, 29 (2004).
46. Enthoven, supra note 41.
47. Enthoven, supra note 41.
48. See CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, WALL STREET COMES TO WASHINGTON:
WHERE IS HEALTH CARE HEADED? No. 67 (Wash. D.C., August 2003), available at

http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/597/597.pdf (last visited June 19, 2004).
49. See Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics Made
Bad Policy, 34 IND. L. REV. 395 (2001).
50. CTR.FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE , supra note 48, at 1; James C. Robinson, The End
of ManagedCare, 285 JAMA 2622, 2623 (2001). Interestingly, "limited benefit" plans are increasing
in popularity. These plans are typically low-cost (around $10 per week), but also limit benefits for
basic medical care to around $1,000 per year. However, these plans cover an estimated 750,000
individuals. Lowes, WalMart, and McDonalds currently make these plans available to employees.
Chad Terhune, Thin Cushion: Fast-GrowingHealth Plan Has a Catch: $1,000-a-Year Cap, WALL ST.
J., May 14, 2003, at Al.
51. For a discussion of the heterogeneity of the uninsured, see Uwe E. Reinhardt, Is There Hope
for the Uninsured, HEALTH AFF. WEB EXCLUSIVE, W3-376, W3-378-81 (2003), at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w3.376vI (last visited June 19, 2004).
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and for smaller companies (figures 1, 2).52 The uninsured population is a dynamic
group: individuals often have insurance one year and don't have it the next.53
People move in and out of coverage depending on their employment status, marital
status, income, age, and numerous other factors. 54 The changing nature of the
uninsured makes it extremely difficult to fashion a single policy or program to
address the problem.
Figure 1
The Uninsured in America, 2002

By Age

45-64

65+
1%

Under 18

35-44

18-24

18%

30%
25-34
25%

52. See HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2002, supra note 4, at 2 tbl. 1, 6 fig.2.
53. See PAMELA FARLEY SHORT ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, CHURN, CHURN, CHURN:
How INSTABILITY OF HEALTH INSURANCE SHAPES AMERICA'S UNINSURED PROBLEM (Nov. 2003),
available at http://www.cmwf.org/programs/insurance/short chum ib 688.pdf (last visited June 19,
2004).
54. See generally HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2002, supra note 4.
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By Household Income

$75,000+
8%

Under
$25,000
24%

$50,000$74,999
12%

$25,000$49,999
19%

Source: ROBERT

J. MILLS & SHAILESH BHANDARI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,

CURRENT POPULATION REP. PUB.

P60-223,

HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE:

CONSUMER INCOME

(2003).

Figure 2
The Uninsured in America, 2002

By Race/Ethnicity *
White
11%

Hispanic

32%

m

Asian
18%

Black
Bac
20%

2002,
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By Education
College
Degree
Higher,or
No High
School

8%
Associate
Degree,
12%

Diploma,
28%

Some
College,

High

15%

School
Graduate,
19%

Source: ROBERT J. MILLS & SHAILESH BHANDARI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
CURRENT POPULATION REP.

P60-223,

HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE:

2002,

CONSUMER INCOME (2003).
*

Hispanics may be of any race, therefore figures are rounded.

Losing health insurance has always registered as a leading fear among
people of all income levels, because it is well known that a prolonged illness or
medical emergency can-more than perhaps any other unpredictable calamitydestroy a family's or an individual's financial security.5 5 If only it were a matter,
then, of attaining universal coverage. What was so striking about the widely read
April 2000 report by Elizabeth Warren, Teresa Sullivan and Melissa Jacoby,
"Medical Problems and Bankruptcy Filings," was that of the 596,198 families that
filed for bankruptcy in 1999 due at least in part to a "medical reason," about 80%
of them had health coverage. 6
The authors also found that nearly half of all bankruptcies involved a medical expense problem, and certain groups-particularly women heads of households
57
and the elderly-were even more likely to report a health-related bankruptcy.

55. See WARREN ET AL, supra note 16; see also TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE
MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 141-70 (2000).
56. See WARREN ET AL., supra note 16, at 4-7 (noting that only 20.9% of debtors filing for

bankruptcy did not have health insurance). However, this survey category of "medical reasons" may
understate the actual number of medical reasons as a contributing factor. Other survey categories, such
as "birth of a baby" or "death in the family" also most likely encompass financial difficulties as a result
of medical spending. WARREN ET AL., supra note 16, at 5-6.
57. WARREN ET AL., supranote 16, at 4-5, 9-12.
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The fact that 80% of those who declared bankruptcy had some form of coverage
indicates that basic health insurance often does not protect families from financial
disaster when they suffer serious medical problems.58 Families may be left with
medical bills that exhaust their health insurance coverage, or "they may discover
that the income effects, such as lost time from work or a shift to less physically
demanding work, impose a financial hardship on a family that basic medical
insurance simply does not cover." 59
Revisiting the issue in 2002, Professor Warren indicated that families filing
for bankruptcy represented a cross-section of America.60 For instance, she
discovered that their educations were slightly better than the U.S. average, over
half were homeowners, and their occupations were typical of the range of occupations in the U.S. job market. 61 By most criteria, about 90% of the debtors in
bankruptcy are classified as solidly middle class, however two out of three lost a
62
job shortly before filing, and nearly half had medical problems.
Invariably, growing numbers of under-insured and uninsured Americans
increases the pressure on the country's public health insurance programs (Medicaid, SCHIP, and Medicare). These programs are already facing serious funding
and demographic problems, and it is therefore worth investigating the extent to
which they can assume a much greater responsibility for providing health care to
individuals who used to have private coverage.
Turning first to Medicaid, the program most people view as the joint
federal-state health insurance program for poor women and their children. In
actuality, Medicaid is an immense and remarkably flexible program that both state
and federal policymakers have continually modified over the past decade and a
half to address an array of society's unmet health care needs, including those of the
indigent elderly and disabled. In the process, the program relieves the suffering of
millions of people who fall through the numerous holes in our country's health
care system.

II. MEDICAID: THE UGLY, UNLOVED "WORKHORSE" OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM

58. WARREN ET AL., supra note 16, at 7.
59. Melissa B. Jacoby etal., Rethinking the Debates Over Health Care Financing:Evidencefrom
the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 375, 377-78 (2001).
60. Discussion with Elizabeth Warren, HARV. L. TODAY (March 2002), available at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/news/today/2002/03/5warren.php (last visited June 19, 2004).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Unfortunately, Medicaid has been largely ignored-relative to Medicareby many health policy enthusiasts and labeled a topic for poverty studies and
welfare policy. This partly reflects the fact that when Medicaid was enacted in
1965, it was considered "a legislative afterthought to Medicare. 63 Unlike
Medicare, however, Medicaid bears little resemblance to its original 1966
structure, and according to 2002 data, has surpassed Medicare in the number of
beneficiaries (51 million to Medicare's 41 million) while almost equaling it in
terms of total spending (roughly $250 billion).64
As the nation's largest health insurance program, Medicaid insures 20% of
the nation's children and, surprisingly, pays for more than one in every three
childbirths. 65 Although the program's original focus was on poor mothers who
received welfare and their children, it has expanded into something of a subsidiary
program to Medicare for impoverished senior citizens and the disabled.66
Medicaid now provides coverage for an estimated two-thirds of the nation's nursing home residents. 67 It also helps more than 6 million low-income Medicare beneficiaries pay their monthly Medicare Part B premiums and prescription drug
costs. 68 Medicaid finances the bulk of the care provided to AIDS patients, half of
all states' mental health services, and one-sixth of the nation's pharmaceutical drug
expenses. 69 The program even provides the financial glue that holds together the
nation's "safety net" institutions: most teaching hospitals, community and migrant
health centers, psychiatric hospitals, and community-based facilities which treat
persons with mental disorders. 70 These institutions are critical in a nation where, at
any given point in time, almost one in every seven individuals does not have the
71
means to pay for substantial medical bills.

63. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid, 346 N. ENG. J. MED. 635, 635 (2002).
64. John K. Iglehart, The Dilemma of Medicaid, 348 N. ENG. J. MED. 2140, 2140 (2003); Alan
Well, There's Something About Medicaid, 22 HEALTH AFF. 13, 17 (2003); THE HENRY J. KAISER
FAMILY

FOUND.,

MEDICARE

FACT

SHEET:

MEDICARE

AT

A GLANCE

(2004),

available at

http://www.kff.org/medicare/1066-07.cfm (last visited June 19, 2004); THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED: THE MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE (2004), available at

http://www.kff.org/medicaid/2004-04.cfin

(last

visited June

19,

2004) [hereinafter

MEDICAID

PROGRAM AT A GLANCE].

65. Iglehart, supra note 64, at 2140; Weil, supra note 64, at 13, 17, 21.
66. Iglehart, supra note 64, at 2140.
67. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-143, MEDICAID NURSING HOME PAYMENTS:
STATES' PAYMENT RATES LARGELY UNAFFECTED BY RECENT FISCAL PRESSURES 5 (October 2003).

68. See Iglehart, supranote 64, at 2141.
69. Iglehart, supra note 64, at 2141; Weil, supra note 64, at 22; MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A
GLANCE, supra note 64.
70. Iglehart, supra note 64, at 2141.
71. See Iglehart, supra note 64, at 2140 (noting that one in seven Americans, or 51 million people,
are eligible for Medicaid).
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As the program "called upon to solve all manner of health-related problems
that no other institution or sector of the economy is willing to address," Alan Weil
explains, Medicaid is still
a program loved by few, denigrated by many, and misunderstood by
most. It is at least three different programs in one: a source of
traditional insurance coverage for poor children and some of their
parents; a payer for a complex range of acute and long-term care
services for the frail elderly and people with physical disabilities and
mental illness, many of whom were once middle class; and a source of
wraparound coverage for low-income elders on Medicare. 72
Medicaid is frequently ignored, if not disdained, by many Americans because
it is a "poor people's program., 73 Like any form of means-tested public assistance,
beneficiaries have not earned their way into Medicaid (like Medicare and Social
Security). Yet this has allowed policymakers to modify the program's eligibility
and benefits over time in response to various unmet health care needs. 74 Responsibility for financing Medicaid is split between the states and the federal government, which pays between 50 and 77% depending on each state's per capita
income (wealthier states pay closer to 50%, poorer states closer to 23%). 75 Last
year the federal government paid for 57% of the program's total cost ($259
billion).76
What surprises many people about Medicaid is the extent to which the program-initially intended for the health care needs of poor single mothers and their
children-has expanded to serve as a "safety net" for the elderly and disabled.
Women and children represent about 75% of the program's enrollment, but only
25% of its spending (see figure 3).77 Able-bodied, childless adults are not eligible
for Medicaid regardless of income level. 78 Most of the program's expenditures go
to cover the elderly and disabled who, as a group, are in poorer health compared to
single women and children. 79 The single largest category of Medicaid spending is
nursing home care. 80 Moreover, "while almost all nursing facility, ICF-MR [inter-

72. Weil, supra note 64, at 13, 15
73. Weil, supra note 64, at 13.
74. Diane Rowland and James R. Tallon, Medicaid: Lessonsfrom a Decade, 22 HEALTH AFF. 138,
139-40 (2003).
75. Iglehart, supranote 64 at 2142.
76. Iglehart, supra note 64 at 2140.
77. See Fig. 3.
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (2000 & Supp. 2003) (excluding from definition of eligible persons any
childless adults under age 65 who are not disabled).
79. MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE, supra note 64.
80. MEDICAID PROGRAM AT A GLANCE, supranote 64.
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mediate care facilities for the mentally retarded], and home health spending is on
behalf of the elderly and disabled," observes Weil, "this group also accounts for 85
percent of prescription drug costs, more than half of inpatient and outpatient
hospital spending, and nearly half of physician services. ' 81
Figure 3
Medicaid Enrollment and Spending, By Eligibility Group, 2001
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Medicaid's growing role as a safety net for these two expensive and growing populations-the disabled and indigent elderly-has prevented it from
becoming an even broader "safety net" for the uninsured. This dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that the states, facing their worst fiscal shortfalls in decades, are
currently looking for ways to restrain their most expensive program's costs (after
K-12 education), not expand its eligibility. 82
What is perhaps most unfortunate about Medicaid's growing status as a
"hole-patcher" for Medicare is that, irony of ironies, the past two decades have

81. Wel, supra note 64, at 17; see also BRIAN K. BRUEN & JOHN HOLAHAN, THE HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED: ACCELERATION OF MEDICAID SPENDING

REFLECTS MOUNTING PRESSURES (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/4056-index.cfm
(last visited June 19, 2004).

82. See Donald J. Boyd, The Bursting State Fiscal Bubble and State Medicaid Budgets, 22
HEALTH AFF. 46, 46 (2003); see also NAT'L GOVERNORS' ASS'N AND THE NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE
BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES 4-5 (Nov. 2002), available at

http://www.nga.org/cda/files/NOV2002FISCALSURVEY.pdf (last visited June 19, 2004).
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shown the former to be a much more promising vehicle for reaching universal
coverage than the latter. 83 Health reformers have traditionally envisioned it the
other way around with Medicare being the vehicle for reaching the goal.84 But as
Lawrence Brown and Michael Sparer point out, Medicare's benefits and
beneficiaries have not changed much since the program's passage. 85 Medicaid, on
the other hand, has maintained its relatively extensive benefits in the face of
economic uncertainty while significantly expanding its eligibility criteria.
Moreover, although Medicare has attractive universal coverage for all senior
citizens and the disabled, it has forgone the flexibility that states enjoy with
Medicaid to craft creative structural solutions and implement reforms such as
86
managed care.
The best example of Medicaid's ability to broaden the level of health insurance coverage-in a way that Medicare never has-is SCHIP. SCHIP constitutes
the nation's single largest expansion of public health insurance since Medicare and
Medicaid's passage in 1965. Enacted in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,87 the
program follows the Medicaid model: federal matching funds for programs in
which states have wide discretion. 88 SCHIP also allows states to reach the program's target, uninsured children who do not qualify for Medicaid, by making
SCHIP an addition to their Medicaid programs. 89
SCHIP is something of the "Kiddiecare" program that social insurance
enthusiasts always envisioned adding to Medicare, but which could not be done
because of Medicare's cost explosion.9" Consequently, the strategy of incrementalism that stalled in the 1970s was transferred to the welfare path of Medicaid,
which policymakers (notably Representative Henry Waxman, D-CA) have cleverly
and discreetly expanded by way of the federal government's annual budget
process. 9 Yet SCHIP, like Medicaid upon which SCHIP is modeled, also
illustrates the limits and disadvantages of expanding health insurance
incrementally via the welfare model. Unlike social insurance, what the government
giveth in the form of public assistance, it can also taketh away (figure 4).92

83. See generally, Lawrence D. Brown & Michael S. Sparer, Poor Program's Progress: The
Unanticipated Politics of Medicaid Policy, 22 HEALTH AFF. 31 (2003) (offering a comparison of the
political philosophies and end result of Medicaid and Medicare).
84. Id. at 31.
85. Id. at 32, 34.
86. Id. at 34, 39-41.
87. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, § 4901, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa - 1397jj (2000 & Supp. 2003).
88. Brown & Sparer, supra note 83, at 36.
89. Brown & Sparer, supra note 83, at 36.
90. See Robert M. Ball, Perspectives on Medicare: What Medicare's Architects Had in Mind, 14
HEALTH AFF. 62 (1995).

91. See Dan Morgan, How Medicaid Grew: The Unmet Needs of the Poor, WASH. POST, Feb. 2,
1994, at A8.
92. See Fig. 4 (illustrating the SCHIP dip).
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COVERING THE CHILDREN OF UNINSURED, WORKING PARENTS

As the largest expansion of government health insurance since Medicare
and Medicaid in 1965, policymakers created SCHIP in 1997 to reduce the number
of uninsured children (approximately 10 million at the time) who were not covered
by Medicaid. 93 The program, Title XXI of the Social Security Act,94 was enacted in
response to a growing economic phenomenon: the single family's household
income was too low to afford private health insurance but too high to qualify for
95
existing public health insurance.
Currently, about 70% of uninsured children live in a household whose total
income is more than $15,670-the 2004 poverty line for a family of three and the
maximum level of income for Medicaid eligibility-but less than $31,340 (200%
above the poverty line).96 The vast majority of uninsured children have a parent
who works full-time (75%) or at least part-time (10%). 97 These families, however,
are either not offered health insurance by their employers or they cannot afford to
98
purchase it.
SCHIP resembles Medicaid's structure in that the program is jointly
financed. The federal government's share ranges from 65 to 84%, depending on
each state's portion of the nation's total number of uninsured children. 99 The states
were given a great deal of discretion in constructing their SCHIP programs, and

93. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CDC, EARLY RELEASE OF SELECTED ESTIMATES BASED
ON DATA FROM THE 2001 NHI S, TABLE 1.1 NUMBER AND PERCENT OF PERSONS WITHOUT HEALTH
INSURANCE COVERAGE, BY AGE GROUP:
UNITED
STATES,
1997-2001,
available at

http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/nhis/released200207/table0ll.htm
2002).

(last

reviewed

July

15,

94. Social Security Act, Subchapter XXI, 42 U.S.C.§§ 1397aa- 1397jj (2000 & Supp. 2003).

95. See Cynthia R. Mabry, Second Chances: Insuring That Poor Families Remain Intact By
Minimizing Socioeconomic Ramifications of Poverty 102 W. VA. L. REv. 607, 643 (2000).
96. ROBIN A. COHEN ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CDC, HEALTH INSURANCE

COVERAGE: ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY 8 tbl.4 (JAN. - SEPT. 2003),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur200403.pdf
(last visited June 19,
2004); Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 69 Fed. Reg. 7336 (Feb. 13, 2004).
97. OFFICE OF HEALTH POLICY, U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHARTBOOK ON
CHILDREN'S INSURANCE STATUS: TABULATIONS OF THE MARCH 1997 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY

5 (1997), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/97chartbk/97chrt05.htm (last visited June 19, 2004).
98. JAMES D.

RESCHOVSKY &

PETER J. CUNNINGHAM,

CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS.

CHANGE, ISSUE BRIEF 14: CHIPING AWAY AT THE PROBLEM OF UNINSURED CHILDREN 1 (1998),

available at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/45/45.pdf (last visited June 19, 2004).
99. ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, COVERING HEALTH ISSUES: A SOURCEBOOK FOR
JOURNALISTS, CH. 2 (2003), available at http://www.allhealth.org/sourcebook2002/ch22.html (last
visited June 19, 2004) [hereinafter ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM].
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were encouraged to be generous with their eligibility criteria. 00 States could create
a new program, expand their Medicaid program to include children eligible under
SCHIP, or devise a combination of both.' 0' By 2000, every state and U.S. territory
had an SCHIP program in place. Currently, twenty-one states and territories are
operating Medicaid expansion programs, sixteen have separate SCHIP programs,
and nineteen are operating combination Medicaid/SCHIP programs. 0 2 Similar to
Medicaid, most state SCHIP plans rely on-and are 3the last bastions of0
traditional, restrictive managed care to control their costs.
The states were initially excited about insuring more children, particularly
as the robust economy of the late 1990s provided them with surplus funds that
were more than matched by the federal government. 10 4 States took great pride in
the new opportunity to develop their SCHIP programs and to reach out to lowincome families. According to Jennifer Ryan, states set up marketing campaigns,
held outreach events featuring their governors, and came up with catchy namessuch as Healthy Kids (Florida), Peach Care (Georgia), and Hoosier Healthwise
(Indiana)-for their new SCHIP programs. 105 The states also simplified their new
programs. For example, they shortened applications, encouraged families to apply
by mail instead of requiring them to come to a welfare office in person, and removed some of the onerous and rigid requirements for individuals to verify their
eligibility for the program. 0 6 The federal government, notably President Clinton
and other members of his administration, did its part to raise awareness of the
program by encouraging potential beneficiaries to use toll-free numbers and the
Internet to learn more about how to enroll. 0 7 As Figure 4 shows, the result of these
initial efforts has been encouraging: enrollment has risen steadily from about 1
million children in 1998 to 5.3 million by 2002.
In addition to reaching millions of uninsured children, the most promising
SCHIP-related development was the way in which the program made universal
coverage more attainable. This new possibility came by way of a number of states
expanding their SCHIP coverage to include the uninsured parents of eligible

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.; see also

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,

STATE CHILDREN'S HEALTH

11,
2004, available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/chip-map.pdf (last updated Mar. 11, 2004) (noting that CMS has
approved 18 Separate State Child Health Plans; 19 Medicaid Expansions; and 19 Combination Plans).
103. See Marsha Gold et al., Participation of Plans and Providers in Medicaid and SCHIP
ManagedCare,22 HEALTH AFF. 230, 230 (2003).
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104. See JENNIFER RYAN, NAT'L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, ISSUE BRIEF No. 781, SCHIP TURNS
FIVE: TAKING STOCK, MOVING AHEAD 1-3 (2002), available at http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs ib

/IB78 ISCHIP5_8-15-02.pdf(last visited June 19, 2004).
105. Id at 2.
106. Id.
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children. 10 8 The theory was that making the program more generous and available
to parents would help states reach more eligible children.' 0 9 Studies of the first four
states to cover parents of children enrolled in SCHIP-New Jersey, Minnesota,
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin-found that the experiment worked exceedingly well
in increasing the numbers of enrolled children and, concurrently, reducing the
state's overall rate of uninsured individuals by also insuring more uncovered
adults.'1l0
But while Medicaid and SCHIP have played innovative roles in keeping
millions of working families from bankruptcy, crushing medical debt, and/or ill
health, their structure shows the inherent limits of welfare programs that are
means-tested and financed by general revenues. First, less than 50% of the children
covered by SCHIP appear to be retained by the program when their eligibility is
redetermined each year."' This is partly explained by the parents of eligible
children either becoming poorer and, thus qualifying for Medicaid, or wealthier
and ineligible for either program." 2 Neither of these explanations for a child being
dropped from the SCHIP program is a reason for concern because they are
(hopefully) still covered. However, in some states the retention rate is as low as
26%113 and a change in parents' income only explains a portion of this very low
number. Many of these "lost" children appear to be the result of parents who are
confused about the rules and procedures they are to follow to keep their children's
coverage up to date." l4 It is exceedingly discouraging to realize that there are still
millions of children without access to regular medical care and insurance protection solely due to bureaucratic misunderstandings or their parent's lack of
knowledge about their eligibility for SCHIP.
Another major problem with the program is reflected in the "SCHIP
Dip.''15 It is estimated that at least 900,000 children are scheduled to lose their
SCHIP coverage by 2006 due to reductions in federal funding. 116 Because policymakers knew that it would take the states some time to establish their SCHIP

108. Embry Howell et al., Early Experience with Covering Uninsured Parents Under SCHIP, in
ASSESSING THE NEW FEDERALISM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR STATES, SERIES I (Urb. Inst., Series A,
No. A-5 1,Wash., D.C.) (2002) (discussing the implantation of section 1115 waivers to cover parents
under SCHIP).
109. Id.

110. Id at3-5.

111. Ian Hill & Amy Westpfahl Lutzky, Is There a Hole in the Bucket? Understanding SCHIP
Retention 18 (Urb. Inst., Occasional Paper No. 67, Wash., D.C.) (2003).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 16-17.
115. See RYAN, supra note 104, at 4-6.
116. EDWIN PARK ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, OMB ESTIMATES INDICATE
THAT 900,000 CHILDREN WILL LOSE HEALTH INSURANCE DUE TO REDUCTIONS IN FEDERAL SCHIP

FUNDING (2002), availableat http://www.cbpp.org/7-15-02health.pdf (last visited June 19, 2004).
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programs, and as part of their efforts to balance the federal budget, the $40 billion
they initially allocated to fund SCHIP was not distributed equally over the first ten
years. 117 Instead, Congress allocated $4.3 billion per year for the first four years of
the program (1998-2001), but then reduced it to $3.1 for the next three years
(2002-2004) before having it rise again thereafter." 8 This means that while the
number of uninsured children is rising-due to the recession in 2001 and the
uneven economic growth the country has experienced thereafter-funding from the
federal government is falling. Metaphorically speaking, this resembles the same
"Perfect Storm" currently battering Medicaid: growing demand for the program,
increasing medical inflation, and declining government revenues." 9
Figure 4
The SCHIP Dip: Enrollment and Federal Funding (Projected), 1998-2007
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OVERVIEW OF CHILDREN'S HEALTH CARE COVERAGE

Recognizing this problem, various members of Congress have introduced
legislation intended to address the dip and restore funding for SCHIP to the initial

117. ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, supra note 99, at Chap. 2.
118. ALLIANCE FOR HEALTH REFORM, supra note 99, at Chap. 2.
119. See Well, supra note 64, at 18-19.
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levels. 120 But consideration of the bills has been prolonged, which has led to a
reduction in federal funding at least in 2002. As long as the economy sputters
along, states will fail to receive sufficient levels of revenue needed to maintain
current levels of coverage. This is the weakness of any welfare-style program.
Social insurance programs, such as Medicare and Social Security, are virtually
impervious to fluctuating economic conditions because they are entitlements on
which the government cannot default. SCHIP, however, is a discretionary program
and policymakers can adjust eligibility criteria and benefits in response to larger
budgetary pressures (by law states have to balance their budgets annually), 12 1 even
if that means that nearly I million children lose their SCHIP coverage over the
next three years.
Because of Medicaid and SCHIP's eligibility and financing problems,
proponents of universal coverage have traditionally envisioned social insurance
(Medicare) to be the optimal vehicle for achieving universal coverage. 122 This
enthusiasm for Medicare has persisted despite the fact that the program's managed
care experiment in the late 1990s-early 2000s failed, 123 and that it has taken more
than a decade of painstaking deliberation and political jockeying to pass a
catastrophic prescription drug plan. 1 24 But it is hard to change Medicare. It is a
generous, universal, fee-for-service program that-at least from the perspective of
its beneficiaries-has been virtually frozen in time from the mid-1960s when there
were no "gatekeeping" primary care physicians, prior authorizations, or other
restraints from whatever modem medicine had to offer.

IV. MEDICARE: THIS IS YOUR (GRAND)FATHER'S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM

"I hate this whole G--damn system. I'd blow it up if I could, but I'm stuck
with it," observed Tom Scully, former Administrator for the Centers for Medicare
25
and Medicaid Services (CMS), which operates both programs.'
If it were up to me, I'd buy everybody private insurance and forget
about it. Obviously that's what the Republican view is: we ought to do
120. See e.g., S. 138, 108"h Cong. (2003); Children's Health Equity Act of 2003 S. 621, 108 t h Cong.
(2003).
121. CAROL S. WEISSERT & WILLIAM G. WEISSERT,

GOVERNING HEALTH: THE POLITICS OF

HEALTH POLICY 208 (2d ed. 2002).
122. See Brown & Sparer, supra note 83, at 31.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 20.
124. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-173,
117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (to be codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C.)
125. Telephone Interview with Tom Scully, Former Administrator, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, 2001-2003 (Oct. 24, 2002).
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what we do for federal employees-go out and buy every senior
[citizen] a community-rated, a structured, regulated private insurance
plan. Let them all go buy an Aetna product, or Blue Cross products;
that's the Republican philosophy. Why should Tom Scully and his staff
fix prices
for every doctor and hospital in America? Which is what we
6
do.

12

Prior to 1994, this view of Medicare was practically non-existent outside of
a few ideological purists (such as Newt Gingrich) who were rarely in a position of
having to govern. The notion that Medicare should be privatized by changing it
from a "defined benefit" to a "defined contribution" plan would have been
anathema to the leading policymakers in Washington. 127 There was a political consensus about Medicare, as Jonathan Oberlander has documented, that governed the
program for the first three decades of its existence.' 28 Policymaking was bipartisan
in character, even when it involved extraordinary changes to the program's method
of reimbursing hospitals and doctors. 12 9 Moreover, Republicans and Democrats
embraced the idea that Medicare "should be operated as a universal government
program, that federal health insurance for the elderly should take the form, in
130
essence, of a single-payer health system."'
The 1994 congressional elections, however, triggered a political
earthquake: Republicans gained control of both the House of Representatives and
the Senate for the first time since 1954.131 After being out of power for four
decades, they had a number of new political agendas, but none bigger than
balancing the federal budget. 132 Medicare had already been viewed for years as a
perennial "cash cow" that Congress had been accustomed to using to free up
spending for other programs and to achieve some measure of deficit control. 133 But
to go beyond deficit control to the next level of actually balancing the budget
would have required substantial cuts in Medicare spending that were far beyond
the consensus that had existed since the program's beginning.
Conveniently for Republicans, in 1995 Medicare was predicted to begin
running a deficit in 2002 and to be completely insolvent by 2032, when the entire
134
"Baby Boom" generation had reached retirement age (see figures 5, 6).
Republicans responded by proposing $270 billion in Medicare spending reductions

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id.
JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 157 (2003).

See generally id., for a detailed analysis of the history and politics of Medicare.
Id. at 157-96.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 163-76.
Id. at 172-73.
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over seven years as part of a "Save Medicare" campaign.' 35 President Clinton's
veto of this and other critical budget legislation passed by the Republicans
triggered the famous government shutdown in late 1995-early 1996.136 President
Clinton emerged the political winner from his showdown with House Speaker
Newt Gingrich and the House Republicans, and went on to win reelection handily
in 1996.137 In August of 1997, Congress and the President passed the Balanced
Budget Act (BBA), which included a number of Medicare reforms and cuts in the
program's spending totaling $115 billion over five years. 138
The centerpiece of the 1997 Medicare reforms was policymakers' creation
of Medicare+Choice ("M+C"), which sought to dramatically increase the number
of senior citizens in participating managed care plans. 139 There were already 5
million Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in various managed care plans in 1997
(14% of the program's total population), 140 but Republicans had ambitions to
significantly increase that number. As Tom Scully previously explained, they
wanted to do four things in particular: (1) expand beneficiaries' health care
choices; (2) provide additional benefits, such as prescription drug coverage; (3)
restrain the growth of federal Medicare spending by encouraging competition
among private health plans; and, (4) reduce the need for direct government regulation of provider payment policies. 141 In short, Republicans desired to
fundamentally change Medicare to a program that provided beneficiaries with a
defined contribution towards the purchase of a private health insurance plan.
When M+C was adopted, the Congressional Budget Office predicted that it
would eventually enroll 13-15 million individuals or around 34% of the entire
Medicare population by 2005.142 Instead, enrollment in M+C peaked in 1999, at
17% of beneficiaries, and has since fallen back to less than 12% in 2003.43
Furthermore, of the 346 managed care plans that were participating in M+C in

135. Id. at 172; see also George Hager, Medicare is Targetedfor Large Cuts, CONG. Q., Apr. 8,
1995, at 1013; Charles N. Kahn III & Hanns Kuttner, Budget Bills and MedicarePolicy: The Politicsof
the BBA, 18 HEALTH AFF. 37, 39-40 (1999).
136. Kahn & Kuttner, supra note 135, at 42.
137. See Kahn & Kuttner, supra note 135, at 41, 42.
138. Kahn & Kuttner, supra note 135, at 42-43.
139. BRIAN BILES ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, MEDICARE + CHOICE AFTER FIVE YEARS:
LESSONS FOR MEDICARE'S FUTURE FINDINGS FROM SEVEN MAJOR CITIES 1 (2002).

140. Id. at vii, 21 app. A.
141. Id. at 1.
142. Sandra Christensen, Medicare+Choice Provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, 17
HEALTH AFF. 224, 228 (1998).
143. Marsha Gold, Can Managed Care and Competition Control Medicare Costs?, HEALTH AFF.
WEB EXCLUSIVE, W3-176, W3-177 (Apr. 2, 2003), at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/
reprint/hlthaff.w3.176vI (last visited June 19, 2004); MARSHA GOLD & LORI ACHMAN, MATHEMATICA
POLICY RESEARCH, INC., SHIFTING MEDICARE CHOICES:

1999-2003, No. 8 (2003), available at

http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/PDFs/fastfacts8.pdf (last visited June 19, 2004).
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1998, only 156 were still in the program five years later.14 4 The remaining plans
have become much less attractive to Medicare beneficiaries, as most have
45
increased premiums and decreased benefits, such as prescription drug coverage. 1
Ultimately, M+C proved to be an unstable foundation for policymakers to
pursue broader reform of the program. Republicans and Democrats disagree over
why the M+C initiative failed-either the plans were over-regulated and underpaid
by the government or the Medicare population is simply unsuited for profitoriented managed care. 146 However, most would agree that policymakers are left
facing a Herculean challenge: they need to find ways to restrain Medicare's costs,
while also expanding the program to cover increasingly important but expensive
items such as outpatient prescription drugs and nursing home care. Unfortunately,
time is not on their side (figures 5, 6).
Figure 5
Medicare's Enrollment in Millions (Projected), 1970-2030
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Figure 6
Medicare's Trust Fund Balance as % of Annual Costs (Projected), 1990-2030
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The risk that a major intergenerational conflict will arise in the future between retirees, and workers who finance retirees' Social Security and Medicare
benefits, is considerable. Currently, Medicare takes in increasingly more money
by way of the payroll tax than it pays out in benefits, in part because the ratio of
workers to retirees is sufficiently high (nearly four to one) that it generates a
surplus of revenue. 147 This trend is expected to change dramatically beginning in
2011, when the first of the Baby Boomers-the 77 million individuals born
between 1946 and 1964-reaches the retirement age of sixty-five. 148 At that point
the ratio will have declined to approximately 3.6 workers to each retiree. 149 By
2030, when the last of the Baby Boomers becomes eligible, the ratio will have
50
fallen to 2.4 workers to 1 retiree.'

147. THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOsp. INS. AND SUPPLEMENTARY MED. INS. TRUST FUNDS, THE
2003 ANNUAL REPORT, H.R. DOC. No. 108-48, at 13, 49-50, fig.ll.B.5 (2003).
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At that point, policymakers will only have three options available to keep
Medicare going: increase workers' taxes, decrease beneficiaries' benefits, or some
combination of the two.' 51 Policymakers could increase the age of eligibility, but it
is politically unlikely. The unavoidable future necessity, then, to either increase
taxes or decrease Medicare's benefits, makes the recent debate in Congress--over
how to add an expensive (approximately $500 billion) prescription drug benefit to
52
the program-border on the surreal.1
Adding drug coverage to Medicare was fiscally irresponsible, but
politically attractive because it benefits the largest and most active voting block in
the country: retirees. Coverage of outpatient prescription drugs was not included
when Medicare passed in 1965, because it was a relatively insignificant part of
medical care at the time.' 53 The comparatively few drugs in existence were affordable. However, since then prescription drugs have become a critical part of modem
medicine's armamentarium. They have also become exceedingly expensive, especially for the elderly, most of whom live on fairly modest fixed incomes.
Consequently, there was nearly unanimous agreement among policymakers
that some type of drug benefit needed to be added to Medicare. Yet two-thirds of
the program's beneficiaries already have some form of prescription drug coverage
(through plans they continue to receive from their previous employers, private
Medigap policies, Medicaid, or their enrollment in an M+C plan).' 54 So as with all
public health insurance initiatives, the trick for policymakers has been how to
expand the public safety net for those who desperately need help without
encouraging employers to curtail their own retiree drug plans and dump the burden
on Medicare, thereby driving up the cost to taxpayers and leaving some of the
elderly with worse coverage than they have now. While over 60% of U.S.
companies provided their retirees with health benefits in 1988, less than 35% do so
today. 155 Policymakers do not want to exacerbate this trend.
This is arguably the dilemma facing our nation's health care system, which
is half private, half public and has gaps in-between: How do policymakers wisely
and effectively expand the system's public programs without undercutting the
private sector's health insurance arrangements? If the government expands the

15 1. See generally FELDSTEIN, supra note 149, at 92-95 (detailing several proposed approaches for
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eligibility of existing public health insurance programs, it could provide too many
incentives for businesses to stop providing health coverage as a fringe benefit.

V. LEARNING FROM CLINTON'S FAILURE: A DECADE LATER

In the spring of 1993, one year before he died, former President Richard
Nixon visited the White House at the invitation of President Clinton. Shortly after
he arrived, he pulled Hillary aside and said, "You know, I tried to fix the health
care system more than twenty years ago. It has to be done sometime." She replied,
"I know, and we'd be better off today if your proposal had succeeded. 156
Ironically, she crafted a plan that closely resembled Nixon's proposal and which
ultimately met the same fate: defeat. Reflecting on the outcome ten years later she
concluded: "Someday we will fix the system. When we do it, it will be the result of
more than fifty years of efforts by Harry Truman, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter
15 7
and Bill and me. Yes, I'm still glad we tried."'
Given both the forests of trees and vats of ink consumed while analyzing
the defeat of health care reform in 1993-94, one pauses before consuming any
more. The only worthwhile purpose this author can see in revisiting Clinton's
failure is to releam some important lessons about the politics of health care reform.
Because hope springs eternal and significant problems with our health care system
continue to fester, it is likely that there will be another major push for health care
reform in the future. Unfortunately, the Clinton effort provides several object
lessons in how not to go about it.
Before taking a more critical look at the Clintons' health care reform
efforts, they are to be applauded for having even tried, despite the fact that the
likelihood of success was low from the outset. President Clinton was narrowly
elected in 1992 in a three-way race in which he ultimately received less than 50%
of the popular vote.' 58 Once in office, his administration had to face an economy in
recovery and enormous annual budget deficits of $200 billion a year "as far as the
eye could see." 15 9 Hence, there was little to no room for error and no unused
money lying around for major new policy initiatives. Moreover, opting for
comprehensive reform-rather than the incremental variety-reduced his
administration's chances for success even further.
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Nevertheless, the Clintons chose a plan modeled on Republican President
Richard Nixon's 1974 health care proposal and built on the same market-oriented
strategies that Republicans today desire to impose on Medicare. So there was a
chance, however remote, that the Clintons' efforts could have succeeded
politically. As Robert Winters, Chairman of Prudential Insurance and Head of the
Business Roundtable's Health Care Task Force (which became one of the leading
groups opposed to President Clinton's efforts), said: "Were there days when we
thought the Clinton plan was going to go through and pass? Oh, yes,
absolutely!' 160 At the time, the Democrats controlled the Presidency and both
houses of Congress, the media was largely sympathetic to the goal of
comprehensive reform, and millions of working- and middle-class Americans were
without health insurance and millions more lived in daily fear that they could soon
join them. 161 In addition, there were many large businesses saddled with enormous
health care costs for their workers, and especially their retirees, that desperately
wanted major change to the country's health care system. 62 Thus, there was good
reason for the abundance of optimism that surrounded the issue of health care
reform in 1993.
It is difficult to condense the different explanations for the Clintons' failure
into a single coherent argument, but alienation is a theme that runs through most of
them. In brief, the self-imposed alienation of key policymakers in the Clinton
administration (particularly Hillary Clinton and Ira Magaziner) and the extent to
which they subsequently alienated key policymakers both in Congress and in the
larger health care community led to a health care plan-and a strategy for passing
it-that was critically lacking in political feasibility. Hillary Clinton has admitted
as much: "After twenty months, we conceded defeat. We knew we had alienated a
wide assortment of health care industry experts and professionals, as well as some
of our own legislative allies.' 163 This alienation, which made passing any kind of
reform impossible, unfolded and intensified over time.
The alienation began with the 500+member President's Task Force on
National Health Care Reform that the Clinton administration created in early 1993
for the purposes of drafting a health care reform proposal. 164 Walter Zelman, a key
health policy advisor to the Clintons and a senior member of the Task Force,
explains why it was such a mistake:

160. Telephone Interview with Robert Winters, Head of the Business Roundtable's Health Task
Force, 1988-1994; Chairman, Prudential Ins. Co., 1986-1994 (August 28, 2002).
161. CLINTON, supra note 156, at 144.
162. CLINTON, supra note 156, at 145.
163. CLINTON, supra note 156, at 247.
164. CLINTON, supra note 156, at 148.
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There are all kinds of ways to make policy. One is to put a small
number of people into a back room and have them thrash it out. Another
is to have a large, slow, public, participatory effort that builds, you
hope, to consensus and public support. We picked the worst of both
models, secret and huge. .

.

. [T]he public-and worse, all kinds of

interest groups-saw
500 people behind closed doors, with themselves
165
on the outside.
Bob Boorstin, Communications Director for the Task Force, puts it more
bluntly:
[W]hat happened with the Health Care Task Force was that it did three
things. One, it pissed off the journalists. So the journalists were looking
for everything and anything they could find that reflected badly on the
process. .

.

. [T]he second group that it pissed off was all the

Republicans who had burrowed in at HCFA [the Health Care Financing
Administration] and OMB [the Office of Management & Budget],
particularly at OMB and these people where the minute they saw an
option paper would leak it. So you've got all these headlines and stuff in
the Post and the Times and the [Journal] and everywhere totally based
on leaks from Republicans who were hold-overs from Bush who had
burrowed into the bureaucracy in order to save their butts, their jobs,
their pensions, whatever. So there's a pretty devastating combination.
And then you had the third group that was really pissed off were the
lobbyists. Because they had no way in.16 6And closing the door in the face
of a lobbyist is going to piss them off.
In retrospect, Hillary Clinton agreed that the Task Force was the wrong way
to start the policymaking process:
"The group was so large that some members concluded they were not at the
center of the action where the real work was getting done. Some got
frustrated and stopped coming to meetings. Others became narrowly
interested in their own piece of the agenda, rather than invested in the
outcome of the overall plan. In short, the attempt to include as many people
and viewpoints as possible-a good idea in principle-ended up weakening
167
rather than strengthening our position.'
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The second stage of alienation involved the exclusion of President
Clinton's key budget and economic advisors, who would have advocated a less
ambitious and more politically feasible proposal for health care reform. Leon
Panetta (Director of OMB), Laura D'Andrea Tyson (Chair of the Council of
Economic Advisors), Robert Rubin (Chair of the National Economic Council),
Lloyd Bentsen (Secretary of the Treasury), and Alice Rivlin (Deputy Director of
OMB) had just helped Clinton pass his first budget in August 1993. It proved to be
the single biggest and most important accomplishment of the President's first
term. 168 The plan required extensive negotiating with numerous members of Congress and difficult political choices, including raising taxes. 169 It passed by one
vote in the House and by the tie-breaking vote of Vice President Gore in the
Senate. 170 Based on this experience and their professional backgrounds, Clinton's
budget and economic advisors were far more knowledgeable than Hillary, Ira
Magaziner, or any member of the Health Care Task Force about what was and was
not politically feasible. But probably because of the tough questions they would
have asked (and later did ask) about the health reform plan, Rivlin claims, they
were largely excluded from the Task Force's drafting process. 17 1 Their lack of
input, in Panetta's opinion, damaged the plan's political prospects:
[I]nstead of the careful work that went into developing the budget...
[t]he health care thing became part of a political strategy. . . . The
President's plan was designed by a smaller group of individuals...
[and] [o]nce it was done, it was very difficult to try to change it. And a
lot of us ... indicated our concerns with what would take place. I mean,
I had kind of a double concern, which was not only the nature of what
was being proposed, because it was so hard to understand, but,
secondly, I said that the problem is that Congress is not going to be able
to understand the implications here. Congress cannot digest this big a
piece of legislation in one bite ....
It didn't have a lot of useful politics,
so the problem is that they lost sight of the fact that without being able
to sell it politically, it wasn't going to happen. Unfortunately, of all the
battles we'd been through to try to get the budget put in place, you

168. See CLINTON, supra note 156, at 179.
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know, all of those 72lessons just went out the window with the rest of
health care reform.1
Without the involvement of the administration's key budget and economic
advisors, the plan's ambitions were never cross-checked against what realistically
could be passed in Congress. The end result, as Robert Rubin points out, was a
politically impossible situation: "I think that partly it's because it [the process] led
into something that was too large to accomplish at one time .... [T]he reform of
the health care system in one fell swoop was more than anybody could expect to
173

accomplish."'

The last stage of alienation involved key members of Congress and their
staff. It was not only senior Republicans, such as Representative Newt Gingrich
and Senator Phil Gramm, who were logically and by necessity excluded because of
their bitter opposition to any reform whatsoever. 74 Moderate and conservative
Democrats, many of whom had extensive backgrounds in health policy, were also
ignored.175 In addition to Hillary and Ira Magaziner's naivet6 and hubris, perhaps
part of this exclusion can be attributed to the less than helpful advice Hillary
claims she received from key senior Democratic members of Congress early in the
process:
We had originally envisioned presenting Congress with an outline of
principles that would shape the health care reform legislation. But we
subsequently learned that Congressman Dan Rostenkowski expected us
to produce a detailed bill, complete with legislative language. Giving
Congress a comprehensive bill at the outset turned out to be a
tremendous challenge and a tactical mistake for us. We thought it would
be 250 pages at most, but as drafting continued, it became clear that the
bill needed to be much longer, in part because the plan was complex and
in part because we acquiesced to some specific requests from interested
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groups. . ..The Health Security Act delivered176by the White House to
Congress on October 27 was 1,342 pages long.
But David Abernethy, Staff Director of the House Ways and Means
Committee at the time, denies this claim and points to the Clinton administration's
lack of Washington experience as a major weakness in moving health care reform
along in a timely manner:
[H]ealth care was already receding as an issue, because the Clinton
administration took nine months to get a proposal up to the Hill....
[Mrs. Clinton] use[d] to love to say, "Well, you know your boss," in
other words Rostenkowski, "said that we had to send up a bill." And I
finally one time, the third time she said that to me, I looked at her and
said "Look, there's a bill and then there's a bill." Rostenkowski did not
mean 1,000+ pages of finely dense type. What he meant was that you
had to have a reasonably fully fledged-out proposal, so that it was clear
what you wanted." As I said, "You know what, you and I, with all due
respect Mrs. Clinton, could have knocked that out in a weekend."
But they didn't know any better. They were new to Washington. This
is a problem with electing a governor and particularly a governor of a
small state. A governor of California might be better positioned to
understand what it takes to survive in Washington. But they really
77
didn't know. The first meetings with them were painful, just painful. 1
The Clinton administration and its Democratic allies in Congress did not
need-and never would have received-help from most Republican members.
However, the administration did need a few, key moderate Republicans for health
care reform to be politically feasible. Other than the late Senator John Chafee of
178
Rhode Island, the Clinton team chose not to seriously engage any Republicans.
According to Sheila Burke (Chief of Staff for Republican Senator and Majority
Leader Bob Dole), this partisan alienation was a crucial mistake, but also a
function of the bitter politics that existed then:
I think the politics of the time didn't permit it. I think there were a
series of decisions that were made that almost precluded ...our coming
to what would have normally been a compromise. I think the decision to
exclude the Republicans from the outset was a huge mistake on the part
of the White House.... Mr. Rostenkowski tried to warn them; Senator

176. CLINTON, supra note 156, at 191.
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Moynihan tried to warn them. [But the Democrats] had problems on
their own side, so that all the pieces that could have been put into place
[for a compromise] had no opportunity. And then it just became too late
too close to the ['94] elections....
[B]ut at the end of the day you want to solve a problem. It was the
history between the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
[Committees], where ... we would often be at opposite ends but there
was a commitment ... whether is was Dole as Chairman or Packwood,
or Bentsen, or Rostenkowski ... to come to closure. And we weren't
permitted to do that. It was terrible.... [I]n the 20 years I've served as a
staff member on the Hill, it was by far the worst experience I ever had
and I had some horrific experiences. It was the
worst. It is the period of
79
time I look back on with the greatest regret.
Once the sense of alienation had reached such a high level and affected so
many leading representatives of the health care system, comprehensive health
reform was effectively dead. Worst of all, making a mid-course correction
sometime in 1994-in order for a compromise to be reached over a more modest,
incremental reform plan-became politically infeasible as well.
Even millions of middle class Americans came to feel alienated by the
manner in which the Clintons tried to sell their reform plan. "We kept trying to link
middle-class concerns to lower-income concerns, knowing that we had an
opportunity to piggyback the universal coverage issue onto middle-class insecurities regarding the potential loss of health insurance. But it was a tough sell,"
argues Zelman:
What the middle class needed was the opportunity to buy health
insurance at a reasonable price and then keep it. That could be achieved
without universal coverage and without subsidizing insurance for lowerincome persons. We kept trying to make a case that anything less than
universal coverage would hurt the middle class. But that argument had
its limits. It just wasn't true. Every time we made it, we were burning
our bridges-there would be no ground left on which to compromise) 8°
Ironically, after the tremendous disappointment over the defeat of health
care reform faded over time and the managed care revolution took off with a
vengeance in the mid-1990s, many high ranking Clinton administration officials
felt a sense of having been spared politically. They came to believe that if the
Clinton health care plan had passed, it would probably have been next to impos-
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sible to actually implement and then President Clinton would have been blamed for
the hugely unpopular managed care revolution. According to one senior Clinton
administration official, "Implementing the plan would have been a mess. And, so,
two things: I think he would have been thrown out [in the '96 election] and his
health plan would have been repealed." ' '81 Laura D'Andrea Tyson, President
Clinton's Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors, on the other hand, is skeptical that the plan could ever have been implemented, much less by 1996:
I don't think the health plan would have been enacted by 1996, so I
don't agree with the notion that he would have gotten the blame .... I

think from the time it would have passed [in 1994] to the time that the
'96 election came around not that much could possibly have been done
that would have [politically] affected him. . . . [The plan] was really
complicated. You were going to have to set up all these . . .HIPCs

[Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives] all over the country. [Y]ou
were going to have to come up with price caps. [Y]ou were going to
have to get the Medicare population enrolled in [new plans] .... When

you actually think about doing something that big....
What I would say ...

is if the average American had ever actually

been forced to choose among a limited number of health care plans run
by regional HIPCs . . . [and if] their range of [medical] services had

been in any way limited, then, yes, I think it would have been [a
political disaster because t]here were some real managed care elements
to the Clinton health care reform. But ... my [personal] view
is that it
182

wouldn't have been feasible [to actually implement the plan.]

In the end, the failure of health care reform in 1993-94, Abernethy argues,
can be summarized in one sentence:
You have to leave the health insurance that most people have alone.
You can't come up with a system that requires you to disrupt the
existing insurance arrangements that most people, even if they aren't
very happy with them, they're not going to let you mess with them. The
problem with [the Clintons'] 'managed competition' . . .[proposal] is

that it require[d] the disruption of all existing health insurance
arrangements. And that is what the Republicans exploited ruthlessly.183

181. The source of this quotation, a high-ranking Clinton administration official, insisted on
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That leaves an obvious question: What can be done to reach some form of
universal coverage and, in the process, improve our current health care system?
The final section briefly examines three competing solutions that have recently
risen to prominence.
VI: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF THE UNINSURED

Three of the leading proposals for addressing the problem of the uninsured
run the gamut from conservative to liberal, modest to ambitious, and Republican to
Democratic. The major disagreements between them, Karen Davis and Cathy
Schoen explain, are over the role of private insurance in covering the uninsured,
whether public programs should be expanded to include additional groups, and the
commitment of adequate budgetary resources required to assist those who are
unable to afford the full cost of health coverage. 184 Each proposal has its own
strengths and weaknesses. Not surprisingly, one proposal's weakness is often
another one's strength and vice versa. To varying degrees they all reflect the
limitations highlighted by the Clinton debacle. Structurally, as Abernethy argues,
you cannot disrupt existing health insurance arrangements. Politically, Zelman
notes, discretion is the better part of valor: "More than anything else... [you have]
to understand the limitations and restraints-all of them, institutional, political,
policy and educational. The opposition will always have more levers, the public
can be moved only so much, and you've almost certainly got less power than you
185
think you have."'
One option advocated by President George W. Bush calls for tax credits of
up to $1,000 for individuals earning below $45,000 a year and $2,000 for families
earning below $60,000 a year.' 86 Uninsured individuals would use these tax credits
to purchase a private health insurance policy. The proposal's primary strength is
that it does not call for any new government program or organization, nor does it
threaten any existing health insurance arrangements. Therefore, it is the most
feasible, modest and least controversial option. However, the proposal has several
weaknesses. First, the amount of the tax credits is not enough to purchase an
adequate policy, especially given that they would be individual/non-group
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policies.' 87 Since the average cost of a non-group health insurance plan for a family
of four is roughly $7,300 per year, even if the tax credit was increased to $3,600,
the most generous proposed, the average family would still have to pay about
$3,700 out-of-pocket. 188 Given that most of the uninsured are working- to middleclass, this amount would be prohibitively expensive. In addition, the cost of
private, individual health insurance policies could increase significantly; employers
could use the new policy as an excuse to cease providing health insurance as a
fringe benefit; and the credits would have to be paid for by either increased
government revenues (more taxes now) or increased government debt (more taxes
later).
Another option, advocated by Democratic Representative John Conyers
and others, involves significantly expanding Medicare.' 89 Citing the high
proportion (upwards of 50 percent) of each private health insurance dollar that is
diverted to overhead and profits-and, thus, not to cover actual physician and
hospital expenses-Marcia Angell, former Editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, argues that what we need is a national single-payer system that would
eliminate unnecessary administrative costs, duplication and profits. 90 In effect,
this would be the equivalent of extending Medicare to the entire population. As
Angell notes:
[M]edicare is, after all, a government-financed single-payer system
embedded within our private, market-based system. It's by far the most
efficient part of our health-care system, with overhead costs of less than
3 percent, and it covers virtually everyone over the age of 65. Medicare
is not perfect, but it's the most popular part of the American health-care
system. 191
If President Bush's tax-credit proposal is too timid or insufficient to help
many uninsured, then the idea of extending Medicare to all suffers from a serious
lack of political feasibility. This option was actually considered by Congress in
192
1994, when the House Ways and Means Committee passed "Medicare Part C.'
The plan became the leading House alternative to the Clinton plan. However,
congressional leaders could not even get it to the floor of the House of Repre-
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sentatives for a vote due to its political impracticality. The extent of the disruption
it would cause to existing health insurance institutions and arrangements precludes
this option from being seriously considered any time soon. The health care system
would have to deteriorate further by several orders of magnitude before a massive
expansion of Medicare ("Medicare for All" or "Universal Medicare") would have
any chance at passing.
The last, and perhaps most popular, option is something of a middleground approach that combines individual obligations and government subsidies.
Using the example of automobile insurance, Senator John Breaux (D-LA) and
others argue that health insurance should simply be mandatory. According to
Senator Breaux,
I'd like to see a nationwide federal mandate that every U.S. citizen
purchase a private health insurance policy. There would be a basic plan,
that the government would help fund for low-income people who cannot
afford it. The government's subsidy would be graduated according to
income, to the point where you would ultimately be responsible for
paying for it all yourself when you can afford to. People could buy more
193
than the basic plan if they wanted to, but it would be at their expense.
One of the keys to this option working is that it would enroll tens of millions
of uninsured Americans who are below the age of thirty-five. 94 Mandating that
this massive demographic group of young and mostly healthy Americans join the
insurance risk pool would drive down the costs for everyone, because they would
pay a lot more money into the system (in the form of premiums) than they would
195
consume in the form of medical care.
Senator Breaux and others ultimately see this option replacing employerprovided insurance over time, which is radical. But as Senator Breaux argues,
Look at the problems we've got in this country right now with
employer-sponsored health insurance. Health benefits are among the
fastest-growing costs employers face now, and some can't afford to pay
for health care any more-many, particularly small businesses, are
dropping it entirely. Of course, a lot of people like their employer plan
and would want to stay in it. We want to make sure that we don't
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discourage those who
are providing coverage from continuing to do so,
1 96
if it works for them.'
According to Ted Halstead, President of the New America Foundation,
The new system would also be an improvement for Americans who
receive their health insurance from their employers. They would be able
to select their own insurance policy and level of coverage from among
private providers, instead of being limited to the one selected by their
employer. They would also be able to keep the policy and doctors of
their choice as they move from job to job. Employers, meanwhile,
would not stop paying for coverage-they would simply contribute to
the policy of their employee's choosing. After all, employer-subsidized
health insurance is voluntary now, and there is little
reason to believe
97
that employers would suddenly stop providing it. 1
A government mandate for people to purchase their own insurance is an
innovative concept, but not a new one. It was part of the Senate Finance Committee's alternative to the Clinton plan in 1994. Similar to the first option of tax
credits, an individual mandate does not significantly expand current government
programs nor does it create new ones. This feature makes it less threatening to the
status quo and, hence, more politically feasible. But an individual mandate has
problems of its own. First, it would be enormously expensive. Two-thirds of the
uninsured would need substantial government subsidies to be able to afford an
individual health insurance policy, thus the government would have to provide
upwards of $60-90 billion per year.' 98 Moreover, as Jonathan Oberlander points
out, an individual mandate plan has no cost-control mechanisms. 99 It relies instead
on the vague hope that competition between private insurers will lower
health-care costs. Yet the American experience with competition in
medical care provides no basis for relying on a private system-the
most expensive in the world, incidentally-to slow health spending.
Without government regulation and freed from the negotiating leverage
that big companies now exert for premium discounts, there would be no
constraints on private insurers who wanted to raise prices. Under an
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individual mandate program, health-care spending and insurance
premiums would continue to escalate, necessitating sizable increases in
public subsidies-and likely generating political pressure to retreat from
universal coverage.2 °°
VII. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it does not seem likely that universal coverage, the Mount
Everest of public policy in the United States, will be conquered any time soon.
Maybe individual states, such as Maine and Oregon, will lead the way in
innovative policymaking. Maybe it will take a Republican president, willing to risk
political martyrdom, to reach across the political aisle and work with Democrats in
Congress for comprehensive health care reform to ever pass. Maybe politics will
change substantially when the majority of Baby Boomers have retired in the next
twenty years and demand the best that modem medicine has to offer. Maybe health
care costs, insurance premiums, and the number of uninsured will eventually
increase to some critical point (yet to be reached) where sufficient numbers of
middle class voters will finally demand that government do something on their
behalf. There is no way, however, to accurately predict what straw will finally
break the system's back. But the history of health reform is clear about one thing:
despite its numerous shortcomings and failures, which cause immense amounts of
suffering for millions of people, our health care system has shown an extraordinary
ability to muddle through one crisis after another. In the process, it has successfully
repelled every attempt at comprehensive reform. Invariably, then, we are left with
' 20 1
King David's memorable lament: "But thou, 0 Lord, how long?
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